

CREATING JOBS

AND REBUILDING LIVELIHOODS IN
POST-CONFLICT SITUATIONS



CENTER FOR STABILIZATION
AND RECONSTRUCTION STUDIES

OCTOBER 26 - 29, 2008



NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL, MONTEREY, CA

Creating Jobs and Rebuilding Livelihoods in Post-Conflict Situations

October 26-29, 2008

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ABOUT THIS EVENT

The Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies held its first economic recovery workshop, *Creating Jobs and Rebuilding Livelihoods in Post-Conflict Situations*, from October 26-29, 2008, in Monterey, California. The interactive workshop, which was designed and facilitated by Dr. Nat J. Colletta and Dr. Sophal Ear, brought together 40 practitioners from the different groups of actors charged with rebuilding fragile states. Participants discussed the challenges and trade-offs of various economic recovery priorities and strategies, explored best practices and lessons learned from past initiatives, and crafted possible job creation solutions for different countries in crisis.



The Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies (CSRS) is a teaching institute which develops and hosts educational programs for stabilization and reconstruction practitioners, including representatives from US and international nongovernmental organizations, intergovernmental organizations, government civilian agencies, and the armed forces. Established by the Naval Postgraduate School in 2004 through the vision and congressional support of Representative Sam Farr (CA-17), CSRS creates a wide array of programs to foster dialogue among practitioners, as well as to help them develop new strategies and refine best practices to improve the effectiveness of their important global work.

Located at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, CSRS also contributes to the university's research and graduate degree programs. For more information about CSRS, its philosophy, and programs, please visit www.csrs-nps.org.

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“ If you are poor it is very difficult to conduct an insurgency. People are economic agents and respond to incentives. ”

– Dr. Robert McNabb, Naval Postgraduate School

The Conflict Environment

Leading scholars have aptly documented the havoc that extended conflict wreaks on countries. While the political and social injustices perpetuated by elites are myriad, the destruction and depletion of a country’s economic, social, and human capital often leaves the longest-lasting effects. As elites cement their grasp on power, they typically seize natural resources and other assets, destroy critical infrastructures, neglect public services, and force knowledge workers to flee. Valuable resources, such as oil, narcotics, or

diamonds, can extend a civil war by a decade or more, providing elites with the means and motivation to finance ongoing military operations or buy cooperation. The costs of long-term conflict are high. By the end of a civil war, a country’s economy can plummet by 15% or more, and it could take a nation a full 21 years to return to the economic level it would have achieved without war.¹

“If conflict is so costly, why does it occur?” asked Dr. Robert McNabb, Associate Professor of Naval Economics at the Naval Postgraduate School, a speaker at *Creating Jobs and Rebuilding Livelihoods in Post-Conflict Situations*, the workshop hosted by the Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies in Monterey,

Breakout groups afforded participants with a forum for brainstorming innovative job creation strategies for a wide array of post-conflict environments.



California from October 26-29, 2008. "The common wisdom is that civil war results from political or religious grievances. If you are poor, however, it is very difficult to conduct an insurgency. People are economic agents and respond to incentives," said Dr. McNabb.


Using Rwanda and Iraq as case studies, Dr. McNabb discussed the role of resource scarcity, economic incentives provided by elites, and social conditions in both instigating and perpetuating violence. Scarcity alone is not sufficient cause for violence, said Dr. McNabb, but when combined with other factors it can prove to be a powerful catalyst. In Rwanda, a land redistribution system that enabled Hutus to take free and clear title to Tutsi land, provided that all claimants were dead, helped motivate widespread genocide. And in Iraq, a sheik's edict provided Mahdi Army members with the religious sanction they needed to confiscate Sunni property. As actors design interventionary efforts to stabilize and then rebuild failed states, they should ensure that their efforts reduce these powerful economic incentives, while strengthening ties between states and their citizens.

The years following a civil war are extremely precarious, as noted scholar Dr. Paul Collier has demonstrated in his extensive research on economic development

“ If there are no jobs, ex-militants will turn to what they know best, which is rent-seeking at the barrel of a gun. ”

– Dr. Nat J. Colletta, workshop co-facilitator and S&R practitioner

Fragile States: A Visualization



Source: Tjip Walker and Melissa Brown, US Agency for International Development. Dr. Sophal Ear stressed that states can slip and out of vulnerability and crisis, just as individuals move in and out of poverty.

and conflict in fragile states. Collier's research has found that 42.1% of countries with stagnant economies lapse back into conflict within a decade, but those able to achieve economic growth of 10% annually can reduce this risk to 26.9%.² Given that so many of the initiatives stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) actors execute — rebuilding public infrastructures, transforming institutions, promoting democracy — take years or even decades to implement and sustain, how can practitioners help struggling countries make short-term gains that will shore up a fragile peace, buying time and goodwill for these longer-term initiatives to take root?

Numerous scholars and development organizations have argued that promoting economic recovery is the single most important task S&R actors can accomplish to forestall a return to conflict and allow local communities to reap the benefit of a peace dividend. And given that civil wars and their aftermath create disenfranchised populations — ex-combatants, internally displaced persons, conflict victims, and youth among them — job creation programs are a logical first line of defense. Whether they take the form of training programs, apprenticeships, or direct employment, job creation programs bolster fragile economies while putting at-risk populations to work. Employing ex-militants is especially critical. "If there are no jobs, ex-militants will turn to what they know best, which is rent-seeking at the barrel of a gun," said Dr. Colletta, a workshop facilitator who has helped spearhead the World Bank's peacebuilding and S&R work around the globe for the past several decades. S&R actors know that to eradicate the economic incentives that helped fuel conflict, they must create new, more egalitarian

incentives that address the needs of peace spoilers, while creating a broader range of sustainable employment and livelihood opportunities for local populations.

Creating Jobs and Rebuilding Livelihoods helped participants, who included 40 representatives from both US and international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), government civilian agencies, and the armed forces, explore the full range of issues involved with rebuilding the economies of post-conflict states. Dr. Colletta and Dr. Ear brought field-tested frameworks and resources, best practices, and academic and practitioner insights to their role as co-facilitators of the workshop. Dr. Colletta and Dr. Ear used individual presentations, group discussions, and case studies to help participants explore new concepts and brainstorm targeted approaches to solving job creation challenges in post-conflict environments as various as Afghanistan, Colombia, Kosovo, Liberia, Timor-Leste, and Uganda.

CSRS provides cross-community learning opportunities for S&R practitioners, who bring a wealth of experience to share with their peers. CSRS designs interactive workshops across five educational themes: health and humanitarian affairs, institution building and security sector reform, stabilization and reconstruction skills and tools, economic recovery, and maritime and naval affairs. *Creating Jobs and Rebuilding Livelihoods* served as the inaugural event for CSRS's new economic recovery theme.

Participants use CSRS events to increase their cognitive learning, enhance critical skills, and broaden professional networks they can leverage in the future. "CSRS works

Learning Objectives

Creating Jobs and Rebuilding Livelihoods was designed to help participants achieve the following learning objectives:

- **Develop a deeper understanding of post-conflict economic forces that influence stability, the rebuilding of livelihoods, and job creation**
- **Gain familiarity with operational tools for designing livelihood and job creation programs**
- **Explore a range of policy and programmatic approaches to rebuilding livelihoods and promoting job creation and economic recovery in countries emerging from armed conflict**
- **Enhance their understanding of — and professional networks among — the other communities involved in post-conflict reconstruction operations**

hard to create a place and process where S&R practitioners can turn experience into expertise," said Matthew Vaccaro, Program Director.

WORKSHOP THEMES


Numerous speakers from academia, NGOs, IGOs, and government civilian agencies shared frameworks to increase practitioners' understanding of post-conflict environments and their economic complexity and introduce new frameworks they could use to assess on-the-ground conditions and customize their own approaches. In addition, they discussed successes and failures from past and current jobs creation programs around the world. Key themes that emerged from the multi-day workshop included the following economic recovery imperatives:

- **Performing a Conflict Analysis**
As they move into diverse post-conflict environments, S&R actors

should perform a detailed study of the social and political conditions they face on the ground. Dr. Colletta shared a framework he had helped to develop at the World Bank that evaluated such variables as social and ethnic relations, governance and political institutions, human rights and security, economic structure and performance, the environment and natural resources, and external forces. Organizations that provide a conflict analysis are able to develop highly customized programs that meet communities' real needs and aspirations, said Dr. Colletta.

- **Being Sensitive to Context**
S&R practitioners should ensure that their programs address host government priorities and not try to force-fit initiatives that have worked well elsewhere. Speakers cited numerous examples of S&R experts proposing or implementing actions that

were immediately rejected by important stakeholders, such as rebel leaders or host government personnel, because they violated cultural mores or tried to replace local structures with Western ideals. For example, Ms. Clare Lockhart of the Institute for State Effectiveness cited an anecdote where an American expert developed a new tax law for the Government of Afghanistan when there was already a functioning one in place. And Dr. Colletta, who has worked with the Government of the Philippines and separatist Moro Islamic Liberation Front organization to craft a peace agreement, described how critical failures, such as negotiators' refusal to address ancestral domain and requirements that the Moros, an arms-bearing culture, disarm, doomed peace talks. In such a scenario, "It may not be appropriate to start with a disarmament-led DDR* process," said Dr. Colletta. "Instead, it may be better to start with a reintegration-led process." It is important not to take a prescriptive approach, but instead study the local environment and design programs that meet critical community needs and objectives.



Upcoming CSRS Events

ALL EVENTS ARE HELD IN MONTEREY, CA

- **Security Sector Reform: The Art of Assessment**
March 23-27, 2009
- **Gender Consideration in Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration**
June 21-24, 2009
- **Creating Jobs and Enhancing Livelihoods**
April 26-29, 2009
- **Working in the Same Space**
September 20-24, 2009 (tentative)

FOR MORE INFORMATION ON CSRS EVENTS VISIT WWW.CSRS-NPS.ORG.

CSRS hosts several events a year to help S&R practitioners deepen their understanding of complex issues, improve their skills, and expand their professional networks.

• **Reducing Conflict Drivers**

Economic recovery programs should address and reduce the conditions that led to violence to reduce the chance of its resurgence. Chief among them: economic drivers that favor one group over another, resource scarcity, and perverse social capital. Ethnic differences, which are often singled out as a key factor in precipitating violence, typically are not the linchpin, but

instead are a tool elites use to motivate and mobilize disaffected citizens experiencing scarcity.

• **Promoting Good Governance**

Governance is inextricably intertwined with state effectiveness and economic development, a fact which host governments are usually well aware of. A country that can improve its governance capacity reaps a 300% dividend in per-capita income growth over the



*Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration

long-term.³ However, very few countries educate citizens on key governance issues, such as the mission of state institutions and the reasons behind important civil processes. Said an NGO representative: “When we speak with government and military officials in post-conflict environments, we ask them what they see is the most significant threat to security. They usually say poor governance — or the mismanagement of public goods.” While it can be difficult and perhaps inadvisable for external actors to build state authority, they can foster dialogue over policy goals and help educate local populations on the importance of good governance and how their state’s policies, institutions, and processes influence and protect their lives — and livelihoods.

• **Understanding Cultural Narratives**

Individuals are part of a larger-scale cultural and historical narrative. Seminal events, such as 9/11 or the destruction of Samarra’s golden mosque, can serve as collective traumas and reshape narratives, casting one people group as victims and another as perpetrators. Trapped within their own narratives,



Dr. Nat J. Colletta was the founding manager of the World Bank’s Conflict Prevention and Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit. He now teaches at New College and works with a number of multilateral and bilateral agencies and governments, advising organizations extensively on conflict, security, and development matters. **Dr. Sophal Ear**, an assistant professor in the National Security Affairs Department of the Naval Postgraduate School, has more than a decade of experience in development consulting, with a focus on Southeast Asia. His work experience including stints with the United Nations Development Programme in East Timor, the Asian Development Bank, and the World Bank.

Dr. Sophal Ear (left) and Dr. Nat J. Colletta (right) created and taught the workshop curricula. Ben Oppenheim (center) of the University of California at Berkeley provided daily synopses to help participants digest and retain the workshop’s robust content.

people may respond to cultural cues or stories that seem credible to them, rather than rationally calculate the cost-benefit ratio of participating in violence. Effective economic recovery programs should include a social component that evaluates individual and group level motivations and tracks how they shift over time in response to political and cultural changes.

• **Addressing the Consequences of Conflict**

The physical short- and long-term dimensions of conflict are readily apparent, from the destruction of physical infrastructure and an aid-dependent culture, to reduced economic growth and depleted resources. However, the psychological manifestations of violence may be more subtle and often aren’t adequately addressed by donors. In the aftermath of conflict, local populations may be extremely myopic in their thinking and focus only on their individual gains, whereas over the longer-term they may adopt a fatalistic attitude toward violence or perceive greater risk than actually exists. In countries where violence has become part of the culture, such as Colombia, successful programs address the

// Government and military officials in post-conflict environments typically cite poor governance or the mismanagement of public goods as the biggest threat to state security. //

– NGO Representative

psychological needs of vulnerable populations, who need help adapting to changed gender, familial, and societal roles. In addition, these programs provide at-risk populations with more positive outlets for expressing negative emotion, as well as the tools to manage it.

• **Changing Social Capital**

In post-conflict environments, people typically embrace bonding, or inward-looking social capital, that favors primary group family over secondary group community identification. This type of social capital can be beneficial for survival in times of dire crisis, but over the medium- to long-term it forestalls societal progress. As a consequence, S&R actors need to promote more outward-reaching, bridging social capital, which cuts across ethnic, religious, and other divides and provides the risk taking, networked relationships, and incentives people need to invest in progress and build a new future. In addition, it is important that the state strengthen vertical social capital with communities, providing inclusive voice and choice and building a social compact of legitimacy and trust with its citizens. (See graphic on page 7.)

// It is important that the state strengthen vertical social capital with communities, providing inclusive voice and choice and building a social compact of legitimacy and trust with its citizens. //



Pictured in foreground: Lieutenant Colonel Miemie Byrd, US Army, of the US Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies.

• **Balancing Short-term Goals with Sustainability**

Most job creation efforts are short-term in focus, as donors seek to jumpstart the local economy with a combination of cash for work, microfinance grants, apprenticeships, and other tools. As they design programs, S&R actors need to evaluate how they can build host government capacity to transition successfully from stabilization to recovery. In addition, they should carefully consider unintended impacts their interventionary efforts may create. For example, building paved roads, high-tech bridges, or state-of-the-art facilities may not be

sustainable if local populations do not adopt them or cannot sustain them. Donors often don't provide maintenance budgets or expertise, and thus new infrastructures quickly fall into disrepair.

• **Bolstering, Not Distorting The Local Economy**

Numerous workshop participants discussed how donors can disrupt the local economy by setting high wage scales or bringing an influx of aid workers into the area. When this happens, highly skilled workers leave the host government or other institutions to work for donors. Hence, the stereotype of doctors, who could help rebuild the health services infrastructure, driving taxis for donors because they are better compensated, is a reality that has numerous negative long-term implications. These issues can be mitigated by


involving local organizations in the training and hiring of staff and outsourcing as much work as possible to local organizations. Whatever their approach, actors should take care not to set unrealistic expectations or create a shadow economy that will disappear when aid dollars dry up.

FIXING FAILED STATES

Ms. Lockhart, who was part of a small cadre of actors involved with planning for a post-Taliban Afghanistan, offered a bird’s-eye view on the successes and failures of the US Government and other actors’ work to create a legitimate state. Successes included creating a simple framework of high priority objectives through the Bonn Agreement, involving Afghan traders in converting the currency system, contracting directly with telecommunications providers to spur mass adoption of cell phones, and creating transparent mechanisms for dispersing cash grants to villages.

However, Ms. Lockhart also cited numerous failures, including policy decisions that resulted in unplanned and severe economic consequences. Among them: not considering the economy fully in stabilization planning or developing an effective transition budget; not allocating enough money to pay Afghanistan’s 240,000 civil servants, which caused a huge exodus of highly skilled workers from the government; and not ensuring transparency around resource and contract disbursement.

Ms. Lockhart teamed with Mr. Ashraf Ghani, Afghanistan’s former



Source: Dr. Colletta, workshop presentation.

finance minister, to cofound the Institute for State Effectiveness and study how countries tackle the challenges of statebuilding. Evaluating countries and regions from Singapore, Spain, Ireland, and the United Arab Emirates, to the American South to research their book *Fixing Failed States*, Ms. Lockhart and Mr. Ghani pinpointed key success factors, including:

- Leveraging a team of leaders and managers who have vision and

flexibility and are committed to the statebuilding process, rather than depending upon a single leader or personality to galvanize consensus for the path forward.

- Creating a compact between the state and its citizens, not just between the state and international actors and ensuring that the state, rather than external actors, owns the statebuilding process.
- Maintaining integrity and transparency in managing public finance and using as much local labor as possible, rather

than siphoning off assets, using favored vendors, and paying for incomplete work.

- Making massive investments in education and technical skills development, rather than spending monies on technical assistance or succumbing to donor-driven investment fads.
- Creating the infrastructure needed to develop markets and enter new industries, while fully utilizing core assets such as fuel licenses and mineral resources.
- Promoting the middle class, by building housing and industry centers for workers, rather than marginalizing key groups, such as youth, who can become a valuable part of the workforce.
- Developing a well-thought-out strategy for competing in the global market and mapping goals to key investments and policy decisions, rather than making short-sighted policy decisions.

EMPLOYMENT STRATEGIES FOR THE STABILIZATION PHASE

S&R practitioners shared job creation and livelihood development

strategies from across their communities. In some countries, S&R actors may simply strive to create a “holding pattern,” or an “interim stabilization measure” such as job and training opportunities to keep ex-militants focused until the economy can support them. In others, where economic conditions are more conducive to rapid change, actors may seek to jumpstart a nonformal economy where artisans and self-employed individuals can support their families, even if they are not contributing to the tax base; help at-risk populations develop the right skills to integrate into the workforce; or become entrepreneurs by training side-by-side with established business owners.

Job Creation: An IGO Perspective

Mr. Donato Kiniger-Passigli of the United Nations’ (UN) International Labour Organization spoke about his agency’s work to develop employment opportunities that integrate the work of multiple UN agencies, much as the UN’s cluster system has done for the various organizations that provide disaster relief services. “There are so many players. Within this sphere, we try and homogenize or structure the interventions of each UN agency to maximize its comparative advantage,” said Mr. Kiniger-Passigli.

UN programs seek to balance stability with social equity, recognizing that targeting and empowering certain groups, such as ex-combatants, at the expense of others, may create distrust among local communities. Other critical factors to consider include security challenges, a lack of capital, weak institutions, and high youth employment. The UN typically launches three parallel, interlinked tracks within 18 months of deploying personnel to affected areas:

- Stabilization, which provides immediate income generation and emergency employment opportunities using programs such as cash for work, food aid, livelihood startup, and skills training for vulnerable populations, such as ex-combatants, returnees, and others.
- Reintegration, which builds local employment by creating community-level infrastructures and microfinance opportunities to support new businesses.
- Transition, which seeks to create sustainable livelihoods by developing an enabling environment in both the public and private sectors and promoting community ownership of economic growth initiatives.

Participants questioned whether it was possible to build capacity within the host government and transition programs in such a rapid

“ In some countries, S&R actors may seek to create a “holding pattern” with job and training opportunities to keep ex-militants focused until the economy can support them. In more conducive conditions, actors may seek to jumpstart a nonformal economy. ”

timeframe, stating that the UN might be setting up expectations it could not deliver on. However, donor funding requirements necessarily drive how programs are structured and executed. Participants acknowledged that donors' changing priorities or compressed timelines can short-circuit job creation programs' successfulness. "We have challenges getting funding for local recovery," acknowledged an IGO member. "This is a difficulty that we are trying to overcome, which is to help donors appreciate and fund this type of intervention."

Job Creation: A Government Civilian Agency Perspective

Mr. David Dod spoke about the US Agency for International Development's (USAID) efforts to create jobs, using such strategies as providing temporary employment through cash for work, offering targeted support for livelihoods and self-employment, and rebuilding community infrastructures. Mr. Dod provided two case studies: one in Timor-Leste, where a generic jobs creation program met with limited success, and another in Liberia, where a more comprehensive, targeted approach produced longer-lasting results.

// We have challenges getting funding for local recovery. This is a difficulty we are trying to overcome. //

- IGO member



Pictured from left to right: Dr. Bruce Tolentino, The Asia Foundation; Lieutenant Commander Edward Fiorentino, US Navy; and Mr. Phillip Rush, the Bonn International Center for Conversion.

JOB CREATION CASE STUDIES FOR THE STABILIZATION PHASE

Timor-Leste

Working in Timor-Leste in 2000, USAID sought to jumpstart the local economy by implementing a standard jobs creation program to bridge the gap until longer-term funding could be put in place. The program emphasized youth employment and provided a simple standard package of financial support for rebuilding local facilities and cash to support local employment. USAID did not conduct the upfront assessment it usually does with each mission

because of its desire to ensure that at-risk unemployed youth were immediately employed. Another challenge was the limited labor pool; donor competition for skilled workers dramatically inflated wages, creating unsustainable community expectations.

Liberia

USAID ran a Community Infrastructure Project in Liberia from 2004-2008 that combined an aggressive DDR program with employment generation and training initiatives. The program used a single large contractor with 38 grantees who helped to form local NGOs. USAID provided \$50 million in initial funding, with an additional \$50 million in subsequent monies allocated to employ approximately 25,000 individuals, two-thirds of whom were ex-combatants, as well as place 1,000 individuals in apprenticeships. Ex-combatants were given the opportunity to resettle and register for employment or vocational

Reintegrating the FARC: A Case Study

Colombia's Government-Owned Approach Delivers Results



Demobilization Rates

- > 5,000 demobilized
- 3,000 - 5,000 demobilized
- 1,000 - 3,000 demobilized
- 500 - 1,000 demobilized
- 300 - 500 demobilized

Source: Mr. Alejandro Eder-Garces, workshop presentation.

Colombia

Mr. Alejandro Eder-Garces offered a detailed overview of the Government of Colombia's efforts to reintegrate Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) members and other rebels back into society, a program spearheaded by the Office of the High Counselor for the Economic and Social Reintegration of Illegally Armed Persons. Over the past six years, the Government of Colombia has demobilized 48,000 individuals, 37,000 of whom are in the process of being reintegrated. If FARC members continue to demobilize at their current pace through the end of 2009, the group will be so attenuated in numbers that the government will be able to force its leaders to the negotiation table.

Unlike many other programs, the government itself owns and operates the reintegration process, giving it some unique advantages over donor-driven programs: high capacity and political will to sustain what will certainly be a decades-long process, human capital to provide one-to-one and community services, and private sector support to broaden the net of job creation opportunities. Of equal

importance, the state-driven initiative integrates more seamlessly into the government's peacebuilding processes than would donor-driven programs. Colombia's demobilization program includes a start-up phase of 18 months, where the state assesses the territory for the presence of armed groups and the condition of the local economy, and then takes military control of the area. Once security has been established, the state reasserts its authority, providing essential functions such as policing, justice, and the rule of law, and then begins to build the economy and social institutions. The state involves local communities in the recovery process to strengthen institutional capacity and promote democracy. Recovery speed depends upon the local context: An urban area is much easier to recover than a rural area, where coca has been the sole source of revenue for local workers. "There is no shake-and-bake solution for peacebuilding in Colombia," warned Mr. Eder-Garces. "Our startup phase is 18 months, but we're envisioning that the reintegration process will take at least a decade."

After demobilizing from the FARC or other militias, armed persons meet with a local prosecutor, who reviews their records to see if there are outstanding warrants. Individuals receive a single opportunity to confess all of their crimes in return for a reduced sentence. While combatants wanted for a crime against humanity could be sentenced to a jail term of up to 60 years, through Colombia's program they will receive a reduced sentence of only 4-8 years and subsequently be eligible to participate in the reintegration program. However, if combatants fail to disclose the full truth, and additional crimes are discovered, or they then engage in additional illegal behavior, they will lose their benefits and be incarcerated for the full length of the original sentence. Mr. Eder-Garces was quick to stress that Colombia's program was not an amnesty initiative, as perpetrators of violence are required to serve time for their crimes and provide financial reparation to their victims.

Colombia's program is unique in that it provides support not just to ex-combatants, but also to their families and local communities. Since most fighters were recruited as children and have perpetrated and witnessed horrific violence, they have tremendous psychological issues. In addition, they may have

CSRS events provide participants with the opportunity to increase their professional networks, both within and across communities.

difficulties accepting their changed status and gender role, both within their families and communities. Ex-combatants receive monthly, in-home psychological counseling and training that is customized to their unique needs, while their wives receive vocational assistance so that they can shoulder some of the familial economic burden. The Office of the High Counselor also works with local communities, to ensure they can provide the social and educational services ex-combatants and their families need; and the private sector, to create job opportunities and provide specialized expertise to individuals starting their own businesses.

When the Office of the High Counselor began the program, it provided ex-combatants with seed capital to start businesses. "We were trying to make everyone an entrepreneur," said Mr. Eder-Garces. However, this approach had a high failure rate. As a consequence, the program began providing training and apprenticeships to mainstream ex-combatants into the workforce, monitoring them for psychological stability and employability. In addition,


the Office has done extensive outreach to the private sector to overcome companies' natural reluctance to hire ex-combatants.

At a cost of \$8,000 to \$10,000 a person, Colombia's reintegration program is costly, but its success in reintegrating ex-combatants and debilitating the FARC has proven its worth. Each combatant who demobilizes provides valuable intelligence, noted Mr. Eder-Garces, including the information that was used to rescue famed political prisoner Ms. Ingrid Betancourt. Demobilizing combatants have proven to be the most powerful marketing tool the Government of Colombia needs, as they contact peers who are still in the FARC and motivate them to leave its fold. "This is an investment to stop violence and grow the economy," he said. "Our economy is up fivefold in the past several years." The program is government-funded, with about half of the \$600 million budget coming from military sources and the other half coming from civilian sources. The Office provides a purely coordinative role and receives funding solely for its staff. ••



training. Of the two programs, apprenticeships were far more successful, as the training did not provide ex-combatants with viable job skills and the local economy was not robust enough to absorb them.

In addition, USAID provided sector-specific assistance for agriculture, such as irrigation structures, rubber collection training, and farming support, and programs to rebuild local community infrastructures in five separate counties. Roads were a top priority: A local contractor provided design and engineering services, and local laborers rebuilt rural and paved roads. However, USAID had difficulties using the engineering contractor, which made a number of mistakes. In addition, it did not allocate a budget for maintaining the roads.




Pictured above: Dr. Seth Kumi of the United Nations Mission in Sudan.

Mozambique

Dr. Colletta discussed the World Bank's efforts to employ 100,000 ex-combatants who were reentering Mozambique society in 1995. The Bank piloted three different models: a training program where ex-combatants could cash vouchers with local vendors; public vocational school investment; and subsidies for small businesses to hire

additional employees. According to Dr. Colletta, the voucher system was a non-starter, due to its administrative requirements, and the investment and timeframe required to build and maintain public schools exceeded the program budget and timeframe. However, the apprenticeship program was successful: It provided businesses with free labor and ex-combatants with an intensive immersion experience into running a local business.♦♦



// We included local stakeholders in devising our survey instrument, so that we considered the right factors when we designed services and studied where to put new infrastructures. //

– NGO representative

Best Practices and Resources for Job Creation

PROFILING AND NEEDS ASSESSMENT

The World Bank has developed a sophisticated ex-combatant profiling tool to customize its DDR programs. The questionnaire develops a detailed picture of ex-combatants, evaluating their personal characteristics, needs, and aspirations, and leverages local officials to assess market opportunities and institutional capacity. The Bank also works to

develop a robust understanding of the local context, so that it has a clear understanding of critical factors, including conflict drivers, political will, community character, and governance, among others. It is critical to involve local leaders in fine-tuning survey instruments, so that these tools explore the right issues. Said an NGO member: “When we were devising our survey instrument, we brought it to our stakeholders in Southern Sudan. There were a lot of things we didn’t know, because we weren’t on the ground. Is a boma larger than a paya? How far is the village from the clinic or the police station? These factors are important to consider, when you are designing services or studying where to put new infrastructure.”

Participants discussed fragile states’ needs, including security, youth and ex-combatant employment, and access to health and education services, among other issues.



Participants discussed survey instruments and how difficult it is to create a questionnaire that will accurately map the field environment. "I'm really uncomfortable that we are making long, long lists about the things we don't know, when we are trying to do an intervention for a community group," said an NGO member. "The unknowns will remain just that: unknown." Dr. Colletta agreed, but said that the questionnaire enabled field staff to have a dialogue with local stakeholders and discover critical variables in the process. "Don't discount the consultative process and what you will learn from the community. If you learn that 20% of the combatants have AIDS, then you are going to design a program that has a health component." A government civilian agency member said that actors had to balance consultation needs with the impetus to act, to reduce the threat of conflict. However, maintaining flexibility and coordinating with other actors and donors was critical, so that parties could change course if they were headed in the wrong direction.

The group discussed donor trends, and how they can negatively impact recovery work. Said one participant: "In insecure environments, we run into what we call the 'flavor of the month.' Money will be available for



Dr. Heather Gregg of the Naval Postgraduate School shares insights with the UN's Mr. Donato Kiniger-Passigli.


a certain set of priorities, and so everyone will develop programs for those objectives. Then two years later, everyone is onto something else." A military officer asked how S&R practitioners reconcile local community desires and donor priorities. Countered two government civilian agency members: "It's worse than that. It's what the community wants, what donors believe should be done, what Congress is willing to fund, and what the White House wants as policy." Actors must seek to align these different agendas, while building sustainable solutions that truly address community needs. A possible solution to navigating the maze of competing priorities?

"Salesmanship," said a military officer. "You have to package what they want to hear with what they want to get done." In addition, S&R practitioners may be able to use creative approaches to implement their programs, while still adhering to their organizations' guidelines.

BEST PRACTICES FOR JOB CREATION


Speakers and participants offered an array of best practices for S&R practitioners seeking to design successful programs for the stabilization phase, as well as avoid common pitfalls. Actors should be prepared to:

- Monitor fragile states with watching briefs, so that they understand the full range of issues these countries



face and can prepare effectively for deployment. Once on the ground, actors can use their understanding of issues to structure effective discussions with local communities and rapidly ramp up programs.

- Provide funding directly to community groups to allow them to set local wages and increase local buy-in for the jobs creation programs. Community groups will select the most worthy recipients and ensure that wage structures are appropriate for the local economy.
- Keep material costs down so that actors can maximize funding for labor and accelerate program implementation. "The better is the enemy of the good. If you try and do too much, you will slow things down," said a government civilian agency member. "From the time we initiated a program to when we implemented it was sometimes just 72 hours."
- Hire ex-combatants through community groups to help reconfigure dangerous groups, such as gangs and militias. But actors should do "due diligence" on prospective partners, as some community groups may be allied with the very groups practitioners are trying to break and others will not have survived the conflict.
- Use apprenticeships as a low-cost model to train ex-combatants not only in specific skills, but also in critical business practices. These opportunities should be paired with some type of grant program, so that graduates can apply for loans and form their own businesses. Since nine out of 10 businesses



Graphic represents a visual composite of imagery provided by Dr. Colletta in his workshop presentations.

in industrialized societies fail, donors should be realistic about promoting entrepreneurship in post-conflict countries. Helping at-risk populations gain the right skills to enter the workforce will likely yield more sustainable results.

- Provide psycho-social outlets, such as long-term counseling and sports programs, to offer communities a constructive outlet for venting hostility, while promoting social reconciliation. The mental health issues ex-combatants and local populations face after a sustained period of conflict can often be quite severe. Creating socially acceptable outlets for ex-combatants to process their anger and frustration can keep them focused on the future, maximizing opportunities for skill development and wage earning, while minimizing familial abuse or other ills.
- Be clear about job creation program objectives, whether its purpose is to regitalize the economy or simply create a “holding pattern,” moving at-risk populations into fairly compensated training programs or apprenticeships until the local economy can recover enough



Pictured from left to right: Ms Nicole Zimmerman, Monterey Institute for International Studies; Colonel Mary-Ann King, US Army, 352 Civil Affairs Command; and Ms. Lejla Mulic, Sarajevo Headquarters, North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

to absorb them. Map program objectives to the local context, studying the labor market, the absorptive capacity of the local economy, and credit and financial markets. On-the-ground realities will necessarily shape or potentially curtail the type of programs that can be launched and sustained successfully.

- Involve community groups in designing, executing, and transitioning job creation services, to optimize early recovery and long-term sustainability. While S&R

practitioners often provide technical assistance to host governments, consultants' incentives need to be properly aligned with donors' goals of growing local capacity. Ms. Lockhart cited examples of how technical assistance had been used improperly in the past, with consultants firing government staff to bring in other external actors, reducing the host government's ability to deliver essential services and making it ever-more dependent on foreign aid. Instead, external actors should help host governments develop expertise and resources so that they can successfully take over actor-initiated programs. ••



“ In post-conflict work, sequencing doesn’t mean phasing. We get caught up in the idea that certain things like security have to be in place before we can move on. You can provide security by creating jobs. ”

—Military participant

Moving Into the Recovery Phase

While a critical part of the stabilization phase, job creation programs should not continue into the economic recovery phase. Actors need to avoid the temptation of treating economic recovery as “development as usual,” said the USAID’s Dr. James Smith, as recovery requires a decade-plus commitment on the behalf of donors and actors to create the right conditions that will engender long-term economic growth. Chief among them: creating security and addressing issues, from demining roads to ending the political corruption that could precipitate a return to conflict. In addition, actors need to work toward developing an enabling environment by promoting policy reforms that support business growth and reduce discrimination; and helping host governments build vital administrative capacity, including the legal, tax, and regulatory functions local governments need to manage growth. Onerous taxation or regulatory requirements can short-circuit economic growth by discouraging fledgling businesses from investing in growing their capabilities or confining wage earners to the informal economy. Dr. Colletta cited an example where Nairobi artisans

chose to work outside without resources, although a pristine new market was available, as they would have had to take a days-long journey to register at a central authority. The government lost out on valuable tax revenues, while the artisans likely suffered lost revenue opportunities due to the insecure nature of their working space.


Agriculture can provide a constant source of professional and economic opportunities, even before conflict stops, as local citizens need to purchase food and traders continue operations even under extreme conditions, said Dr. Bruce Tolentino of The Asia Foundation. According to Dr. Tolentino, a 1% growth in farm production creates a corresponding 1% or greater amount of growth in off-farm and non-farm production. The entire food supply chain benefits, as local workers create businesses to support the farming industry.

Actors should work with the host government to make the right infrastructure investments and decisions — providing security, rebuilding roads, protecting transportation routes, improving irrigation, and opening public markets — that allow agricultural providers to prosper. S&R actors are enablers, offering educational scholarships for promising agriculture students, creating apprenticeships, and hiring local suppliers and craftsmen. Instead of hiring labor directly, actors should

outsource these services, contracting with suppliers to train and quality workers. In addition, they should be prepared to pay above-market rates to support the local private sector.

Speakers offered the following best practices for ensuring an effective economic recovery:

- Improve security by addressing the full range of issues that led to the conflict. Security is a prerequisite for a healthy economy, breaking down a culture of patronage that favored the few at the expense of the many, as well as enabling rent-seeking behavior that stunted economic growth.
- Help host governments right-size their spending, allocating monies previously spent on sustaining military operations into rebuilding public infrastructure. While finding employment for large security forces is a daunting challenge for actors, sustaining militaries at their existing level can increase community tension and the risk of conflict resurgence.
- Use actionable governance indicators (AGIs) to improve the design, implementation, and measurement of governance systems. The World Bank is using these more finely grained metrics to assess the impact of institutional



The USAID's Dr. James Smith provided an analysis of job creation best practices during the economic recovery phase.


reform on governance sub-systems, increasing accountability by bringing transparency to previously opaque processes and ensuring that they are meeting performance objectives, said Dr. Naazneen Barma. One such tool, the Public Financial Management Performance Measurement Framework, allows users to monitor public budgets, from their adherence to policy guidelines to their effectiveness in execution. Another, the Civil Service Human Resource Management Diagnostic, is designed to improve and depoliticize the hiring, management, and retention of highly qualified civil servants, while creating a fiscally sustainable

wage bill. AGI data from hundreds of sources is available online at the World Bank website (www.worldbank.org). AGIs can help address the problem of leakage by empowering local communities with information on what resources they are due.

- Entice and incentivize the diaspora, with its skills, wealth, and deep knowledge of the local environment to return and organize the recovery. Attract these highly skilled professionals by providing the infrastructure resources they need, such as schools for their children, to encourage them to return and put their expertise to work for their countries. The return of the diaspora will help motivate others to make important capital investments in the country.



- Do not try to restore the economy, just rebuild it. The economy has dramatically changed over the course of the conflict: Not only is it unable to support transparent trading and information flow, but it also cannot absorb all the international aid it typically receives in conflict's aftermath. Arguing for a slower pace of investment, Dr. McNabb said that it takes a post-conflict country three years to gain enough capacity to absorb international funding. As they bring new resources to post-conflict states, actors need to take care not to create unfair competition for local resources or to incentivize the wrong behavior.
- Ensure that economic policies address critical issues, such as scarcity, agricultural supply, and key infrastructures needed to promote growth. "If it's a choice between building a road or a warehouse, build the road," said Dr. Tolentino, "because once the road is there, private industry will come in and build the rest."
- Clarify property rights to enable land reform, but do not expect or require everyone to own land. Scarcity may preclude mass ownership, and many individuals may prefer employment to the challenges of property management. One option is to give economically disenfranchised individuals shares in collective enterprises, such as rubber plantations in Malaysia or palm oil estates and processing plants in Colombia. In return for contributing their labor, shareholders receive regular dividends. However, this approach necessitates that there is a robust international commodity market for goods that are produced and efficient market linkages, such as transportation and a modern communications infrastructure.



Source: Dr. James Smith and Mr. David Dod, USAID, workshop presentations.

- Make sure financing models support S&R objectives. If actors do not require repayment, they should provide cash, rather than commodity grants, to avoid the administrative burden of setting up repayment mechanisms and enable beneficiaries to purchase what they truly need. "With cash, there is one transaction cost," said Dr. Colletta, "so the beneficiary gets more of the money. You empower them to make the right decisions." With commodities, the donor price tag quickly accelerates as organizations must procure, ship, store, distribute, and account for goods, among other tasks. For many institutions, cash transfers are becoming the norm, as it enables organizations not only to route money to the right traders, but also to shift risk to them.
- Ensure that contracted work is completed before releasing funding, whether it is on an organizational or an individual scale. Ms. Lockhart cited the dismal record of contract completion in Afghanistan under the UN's watch. Meanwhile, the Government of Colombia changed both its wage scale and disbursement model when officials realized that paying program participants twice the minimum wage, whether or not they completed program requirements, demotivated them from fulfilling their obligations. Now, ex-combatants only receive minimum wage salaries if they complete key milestones, such as participating in training or going to counseling sessions. Ex-combatants' salaries are direct-deposited into bank accounts that they can access with debit cards, so they will build

a credit history as they work their way through the program. “Ex-combatants receive their stipend based on their performance,” said Mr. Eder-Garces, “so families quickly become both allies and auditors, making sure participants do what they need to do.”

- Fine-tune microfinance models to improve their efficacy. The American Refugee Committee worked with West African business owners to develop a credit history by providing letters that cited their loan repayment histories and demonstrated their creditworthiness. If actors use microfinance, they should protect the up to 15 lenders who support each borrower. Credit defaults not only reduce future lending opportunities, but also hurt existing businesses.
- Position transformative programs within a cultural context to increase their cultural acceptance. For example, in Afghanistan, marketing literacy for women as a tool to help infant mortality would likely be more successful than launching an education program for women that serves as a frontal assault on cultural mores with its emphasis on gender equality.
- Ensure programs consider the effect of conflict and climate

change on the ecology, in terms of reducing the amount of arable land or damaging the water table. For example, Darfur has sustained long-term damage to the physical environment that program designers must consider when creating recovery programs. Local options are necessarily more limited than in a post-conflict environment that has sustained less environmental damage or has a greater range of intact natural resources.

- Foster the growth of telecommunications so that citizens at all levels can contribute to providing critical market intelligence, ensuring transparency funding and service provision, and engage in public dialogue. Ms. Lockhart cited the Government of Afghanistan’s decision to secure donor monies and then contract directly with cell phone providers as instrumental to the telecommunications revolution that has taken place there, empowering five million Afghans with phone access.
- Help foster a business-friendly policy climate with minimal regulations and controls on agricultural production. Educate the private sector about how they can serve the world’s poor and better their lives, while still making

a profit. Fortune 500 companies are increasingly turning to Asia, Africa, India, and the Middle East, among other geographies, to sell goods, realizing that what they do not make in terms of margin on product sales, they make in terms of scale, due to the vast breadth of the developing world and its relatively untapped markets.

- Study existing industries for opportunities to optimize business processes or grow markets. USAID worked with Rwanda growers to improve coffee washing, introducing training, financing, and quality control processes. Over the four-year project span, 72 coffee washing stations were installed, 40 of which were built with project assistance, allowing farmers to nearly double exports of a more costly product.
- Understand that donor timelines may not map to a country’s needs or cultural timelines. Participants discussed the stabilization phase, a timeframe when donor funding is at its highest, but also a time when countries may be ill-prepared to absorb and fully utilize aid. While Dr. McNabb advocated a “do no harm” approach with lower levels of investment in sustainable infrastructures to allow fragile states’ economies to recover more organically, other participants stated that on-the-ground realities and donor priorities precluded such an approach. In addition, participants asked whether it was reasonable to expect job creation efforts to take root in the 18 months to two years typically allotted to such programs during the stabilization phase. ••

// If actors use microfinance, they should protect the up to 15 lenders who support each borrower. Credit defaults not only reduce future lending opportunities, but also hurt existing businesses. //

// S&R actors must deliver short-term gains that communities can see and quantify if they are to buy valuable time for statebuilding and reconstruction. //

Conclusion

buy valuable time for statebuilding and reconstruction. Research has documented that policy-only initiatives simply do not reduce conflict risks to acceptable levels, but that job creation programs paired with peacekeeping forces reduce conflict risks by more than half.⁴

With their degraded infrastructures, depleted economies, oversized militaries, and vulnerable populations, post-conflict environments present a wide array of challenges to S&R actors. A return to conflict is a potentially grim reality for a decade or more, and thus the clock begins ticking on the new peace accord. As a consequence, S&R actors are well aware that they must deliver short-term gains that communities can see and quantify, if they are to

As actors seek to design and launch programs, they are also seeking to manage disparate tensions, consider the needs of a wide array of stakeholders, and build sustainability into their stabilization and early recovery model. For not only is the clock ticking on the peace accord, it is also ticking on donor funding. The majority of monies will typically be spent during the first two years, at a time when host governments are often ill-equipped to leverage

External actors feel a sense of urgency to create job creation programs that will bolster the economy and help prevent a return to conflict.



funds successfully. Workshop speakers provided practitioners with an insightful look at post-conflict environments and the critical variables that S&R practitioners must consider as they design and launch job creation programs. In addition, they provided analytical frameworks and best practices from past case studies participants could leverage and flexibly adapt for future use. Across organizations, speakers demonstrated a bias to developing simple, culturally relevant programs that either bought time for reforms to take hold, or more ideally, were capable of being sustained by local populations with a minimum of resources and expertise. Hence, artisanal apprenticeships showed more promise than elaborate entrepreneurship programs, community-appropriate infrastructure enhancement was favored over state-of-the-art facilities, and cash transfers preferred to microfinance.



Pictured: Mr. Ben Oppenheim and Ms. Nicole Zimmerman.

As S&R actors deploy around the globe, they can leverage the valuable insights and tools they gained by participating in the *Creating Jobs and Rebuilding Livelihoods* workshop. Working hand-in-hand with local

communities, actors can help the perpetrators and victims of violence come together and create a shared vision of the future, one where economic opportunities for the many take priority over spoils shared by a few and a lasting peace is finally able to deliver on its full promise.♦♦


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