



post-conflict institution building
BEATING CORRUPTION
10 - 13 december • 2006

center for stabilization and reconstruction studies
naval postgraduate school
monterey • california



The Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies



The Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies (CSRS) is a teaching institute which develops and hosts

educational programs for stabilization and reconstruction practitioners operating around the globe. Established by the Naval Postgraduate School in 2004 through the vision and congressional support of Congressman Sam Farr (CA-17), CSRS creates a wide array of programs to foster

dialogue among practitioners, as well as help them develop new strategies and refine best practices to improve the effectiveness of their important global work.

Located at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, CSRS also contributes to the university's research and graduate degree programs. For more information about CSRS, its philosophy, and programs, please visit www.nps.edu/csrs.

About This Event

In recent years, staggering levels of corruption in a wide range of post-conflict countries have caused stabilization and reconstruction practitioners to consider whether they need to pay more attention to integrity reforms in their interventions. In response to this growing recognition that the connections between corruption, conflict, and peace building need to be better understood, CSRS held a workshop on *Post-Conflict Institution Building: Beating Corruption* from December 10-13, 2006. More than two dozen panelists and participants from nongovernmental

organizations, intergovernmental organizations, government civilian agencies, and the armed forces gathered to discuss the challenges posed by corruption and the successes and shortcomings of anti-corruption efforts in post-conflict settings.

This report represents the author's interpretations of the workshop's primary findings. Participants did not formally endorse the list of findings or recommendations identified in the report.

Table of Contents

Executive Summary	1
Selected Readings and Resources	4
Factors Contributing to Corruption in Post-Conflict Settings	5
Prioritizing Anti-Corruption Efforts.....	9
Assessing Anti-Corruption Measures.....	12
Recommendations	18
Endnotes	21
Author Biography	22
Event Participants	23

Editing by Holly Larson of Scribble Studio, LLC. Layout and graphics by David Bilotto of dlbDesign. Cover design by Eric Papayoanou of Complex Solutions, Inc. Copyright © 2007 Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies. All rights reserved. The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied herein are those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Naval Postgraduate School, the US Defense Department, or any other agency.

Executive Summary

International actors are changing their approach to fighting corruption, realizing that postponing integrity measures to later phases of reform may increase the scope and severity of the problem in post-conflict countries.

Author:

Jeanne Giraldo
Visiting Lecturer
National Security
Affairs Department
Naval Postgraduate
School

In the past decade, the international donor community has paid increasing attention to fighting corruption by enhancing the safeguards within their aid programs and by pushing recipient governments to enact anti-corruption measures. Despite this new focus, international actors dedicated to the stabilization and reconstruction of post-conflict countries have paid little attention to these efforts, leaving the task for development actors to address at a later stage in the recovery process. This is beginning to change, however, as corruption has reached stability-threatening proportions in a large number of war-torn states, forcing the issue onto the post-conflict agenda in cases as diverse as Afghanistan, Bosnia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Iraq, Liberia, and Sierra Leone.

In response, the Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies (CSRS) at the Naval Postgraduate School has launched a research and education initiative to better equip post-conflict practitioners with the mindset and insights they need to optimize their work in the field. The first activity in this endeavor was

a workshop entitled *Post-Conflict Institution Building: Beating Corruption* held December 11-13, 2006, in Monterey, California.

CSRS events are designed to bring together members of the four primary communities involved in stabilization and reconstruction: nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), government civilian agencies, and the armed forces. *Post-Conflict Institution Building: Beating Corruption* gathered two dozen expert participants from these communities. While some of the participants were anti-corruption specialists, the majority were practitioners in the field of stabilization and reconstruction who have become increasingly concerned about corruption as a result of their work in post-conflict settings.

Participants identified the following findings and recommendations:

- In a number of post-conflict settings corruption has reached such explosive levels that it threatens peace and democratic stability. In part, these high levels of corruption can be attributed to

diminished state and societal capacity, lawlessness and violence, and short-term horizons generated by political instability – factors that are present in many developing countries but which are present to an even greater degree in post-conflict countries. In addition, factors that are largely unique to post-conflict countries – massive international aid, the lingering effects of war economies, and the failure of peace settlements to weaken illicit power structures – are believed to contribute to high levels of corruption.

- Although analysts agree that the aforementioned factors contribute to higher levels of corruption in post-conflict cases than in other developing countries, a great deal remains unknown about the exact manner in which corruption increases during the transition from war to peace. Civil wars themselves and the transitions away from them take many shapes and may result in different patterns of corruption. Analysts and policy makers should be careful to avoid viewing the problem of corruption in post-conflict settings in an undifferentiated way and treating the challenges of combating corruption generically across post-conflict cases. For example, it is likely that petty corruption and grand corruption need complementary but different responses. Similarly, corruption linked to illicit power structures may pose different challenges and require a different strategy to combat it than corruption stimulated by the presence of high levels of international aid.
- In particular, much more needs to be learned about the nexus between illicit power structures, corruption, and conflict in war-torn countries and how these links can be severed. Illicit power structures, defined by a workshop speaker as “entities that seek political power through the use of political violence often supported by criminal economic activity,”¹ violate norms for political participation through their use of violence, challenge the authority of the central state and the rule of law, and are often the driving force behind corrupt activities as they use their illicit wealth to bribe officials or even more perniciously, use their political influence or threats of violence to divert public assets into their own war chests.
- Actors typically relegate measures to control corruption to a second phase of reform in post-conflict settings for a variety of reasons. For example, these measures are believed to distract actors from their primary missions or be too difficult, destabilizing, and culturally inappropriate. Workshop participants felt that integrity concerns should figure more prominently in the strategic and operational calculations of international actors from the start of their interventions. Corruption control should be a key objective, albeit one that needs to be balanced against other priorities, with a cost-benefits risk analysis conducted on a case-by-case basis.
- Reformers should not attempt to implement a long wish list of anti-corruption best practices. Instead, an in-depth understanding of the country’s context, or situational awareness, should inform a strategic analysis of the relationship between corruption and conflict and an equally strategic design of integrity reforms. This requires that reformers develop a methodology for assessing the relationship between corruption and conflict in individual countries, determine the priority anti-corruption efforts should be accorded, and devise an appropriate response.
- If actors are to incorporate the promotion of integrity into the earliest phases of the peacebuilding, stabilization and reconstruction agenda, then it is essential to determine which anti-



corruption measures yield short-term results, are politically feasible, and have a minimum of destabilizing side effects. Workshop participants agreed that it is possible to score quick wins over corruption that contribute directly to the legitimacy of the state in post-conflict settings. Contrary to conventional wisdom, these early victories tend to come not from high-profile prosecutions of emblematic individuals or the work of anti-corruption commissions, but rather from preventive efforts based on state monitoring, increased transparency, and community empowerment.

- Lack of political will among political actors is frequently cited as the most significant obstacle to integrity reform. Despite this obstacle, in most countries it is possible to identify key stakeholder groups that have incentives to fight corruption. Workshop participants argued that successful anti-corruption efforts require an analysis of the incentive structures of actors to identify possible leverage points for reform.
- Quick wins with institution building – both within government and in the

community – improve the quality of life for ordinary citizens by reducing the petty corruption they face on a daily basis, even if a great deal of corruption still persists elsewhere in the system. Quick wins also build public trust in the government by demonstrating the authorities' willingness to deal with corruption. There was consensus among workshop participants that achieving these small gains at the local level may help build a constituency for additional integrity reforms at the national level, although this proposition remains largely untested.

- Participants identified the need to establish a clearinghouse of information on anti-corruption work in post-conflict countries. Very little specific work has been done on this issue, at least in terms of documented experience, research, and lessons learned. The most useful information would go beyond a technocratic laundry list of integrity reforms and provide some strategic analysis and context for action.
- Understanding the incentives – or lack thereof – that different international actors have to address corruption and

the potential leverage each wields is necessary if anti-corruption initiatives are to be incorporated effectively into stabilization and reconstruction planning and operations. Actors involved in this work typically have different purposes, motivations, organizational structures, and methods of operation which hamper coordination and combined action in all spheres. Anti-corruption is no exception to this rule. In particular, developing an understanding of organizational goals and incentive structures will be necessary to mainstream integrity measures into development programs, security sector reform initiatives, and post-conflict military planning.

The findings from the seminar provide an agenda for policy research, operational innovation, and practitioner education that will inform subsequent CSRS workshops to be held November 5-7, 2007, and

sometime during 2008. Information on these upcoming workshops will be posted on the CSRS web page.

This remainder of this report is divided into four parts that summarize the findings and recommendations from the conference. Section I reviews the factors that may contribute to creating a high level of corruption in post-conflict settings. Section II summarizes the debate over the extent to which anti-corruption measures should be incorporated into stabilization and reconstruction efforts. Section III assesses the effectiveness of anti-corruption initiatives undertaken in post-conflict settings and identifies a list of lessons for building corruption-resistant institutions in post-conflict settings. And Section IV provides a series of recommendations to redress the gaps that remain in the stabilization and reconstruction community's understanding of post-conflict corruption and, particularly, in its capabilities to combat it.

Selected Readings and Resources

Bolongaita, Emil. *Controlling Corruption in Post-Conflict Countries*, Kroc Institute Occasional Paper #26, January 2005.

Boucher, Alix J., William J. Durch, Margaret Midyette, Sarah Rose, and Jason Terry. *Mapping and Fighting Corruption in War-Torn States: Report from the Project on Rule of Law in Post-Conflict Settings*. Washington, DC, The Henry L. Stimson Center, December 2006.

Corruption in Post-War Reconstruction. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Tiri, and Lebanon Association for Transparency, January 2005.

Curbing Corruption in Tsunami Relief Operations. Proceedings of the Jakarta Expert Meeting organized by the Asian Development Bank/Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia and the Pacific and Transparency International, 2005.

Dzeidzic, Michael and Michael Miklaucic, *Contending with Illicit Power Structures: A Typology*, draft version, March 2007.

Hussmann, Karen and Marie-Ange Bunga, *Case Study on Democratic Republic of the Congo. Anticorruption Projects Limited by Logics of Transition*, paper commissioned by UNDP, October 2005.

Hussmann, Karen and A.H. Monjurul Kabir, *Fighting Corruption – The Case of Afghanistan*, draft, December 2006.

Johnson, Harold J. "Bosnia: Crime and Corruption Threaten Successful Implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement," testimony before the Committee on International Relations, US House of Representatives. United States General Accounting Office, July 19, 2000. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-219.

LeBillon, Philippe. "Buying Peace or Fuelling War? The Role of Corruption in Armed Conflicts," *Journal of International Development* 15 (2003): 413-26.

Mirimanova, Natalia. Diana Klein, ed. *Corruption and Conflict in the South Caucasus*. International Alert, January 2006.

O'Donnell, Madalene. "Post-Conflict Corruption: A Rule of Law Agenda?" in *Civil War and the Rule of Law*, International Peace Academy, 2006.

Olken, Benjamin A. "Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia," National Bureau of Economic Research, October 2005.

Tiri, Network for Integrity in Reconstruction research projects, January 2007. Available online at www.tiri.org.

Transparency International, *Global Corruption Report 2005*. Special focus: corruption in construction and post-conflict reconstruction.

Williams, Robert and Alan Doig. *Achieving Success and Avoiding Failure in Anti-Corruption Commissions: Developing the Role of Donors*, U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, U4 Brief No. 1, January 2007.

Factors Contributing to Corruption in Post-Conflict Settings

A wide array of factors — governmental weakness, violence, and illicit power structures among them — create conditions conducive to corruption. If not checked, the problem can become systemic, thwarting relief actors' ability to implement effective reforms.

Corruption, which can be defined as the misuse of public office for private gain, is an endemic problem in a wide range of developing countries at both the administrative and elite levels. But it is also becoming more common and reaching higher levels in post-conflict settings.² In part, these high levels of corruption can be attributed to diminished state and societal capacity, lawlessness and violence, and short-term horizons generated by political instability — factors that are present in many developing countries but which are present to an even greater degree in post-conflict countries. In addition, factors largely unique to post-conflict countries — massive international aid, the lingering effects of war economies, and the failure of peace settlements to weaken illicit power structures — contribute to levels of corruption which, under some circumstances, might threaten peace and stability.

Workshop participants discussed how each of these factors contributes to corruption. In some cases, they noted that practitioners needed more information on the links between particular factors and corruption to devise effective remedies. These factors include:

- **Diminished state capacity:** While many developing countries suffer from ineffective administrative structures, this is particularly the case in post-conflict settings where the central state is likely to have been greatly weakened during the conflict. In addition, alternative power structures may have provided critical resources for populations during conflict. The continuing existence of these power centers outside of the state after the end of violence may undermine state authority. Often, the state does not have an institutional identity independent of the actors who occupy key positions; this may mean that the state is populated by networks which provide for their own in a sectarian, and sometimes corrupt, fashion.
- **Weak civil society:** Years of violence often lead to weak civil societies in many post-conflict settings. The organizations that do exist often lend their personnel to the new government or engage in the delivery of international aid, thus depleting the potential supply of organizations



Dr. Laina Reynolds Levy of the Partners for Democratic Change (pictured in foreground) and other participants listen to a presenter.

The concern that violence may return can create an “I need to get what I can now” pathology in post-conflict environments.

to monitor government activities and advocate for transparency. In addition, years of war often undermine the social capital required for transparent governance. The lack of trust engendered by conflict creates a situation where individual groups are prone to use their access to public office to provide for their own private needs, sometimes in a corrupt fashion. Lack of trust in other persons and government institutions increases the perception that individuals or groups are out for themselves; otherwise honest individuals are likely to respond in kind simply to survive.

- ***Lawlessness and violence:*** The general impunity created by lawlessness and violence diminishes the deterrent effect that helps to prevent corruption in other settings. The use of violence against those who would fight corruption similarly undermines the building of corruption-resistant institutions.
- ***Short-time horizons:*** According to the World Bank, nearly half of all

post-conflict countries return to war within five years of signing a peace agreement.³ In practice, the likelihood of a lasting peace may seem even more remote to the inhabitants of a war-torn country, thus reinforcing the short-time horizons that fuel corrupt behavior. In short, the concern that violence may return can create an “I need to get what I can now” pathology in post-conflict environments.

- ***Massive international aid:*** Over the past decade, donors have paid increasing attention to preventing corruption in their aid delivery. Nonetheless, there was a general feeling among workshop participants that donors have not done enough to lead by example and improve their own integrity and accountability standards and practices, especially in post-conflict cases. In addition, the international community violates the fundamental “do no harm” principle by contributing to corruption with their intervention. Reconstruction funds are particularly vulnerable to corruption,



Karen Hussmann, a United Nations Development Programme consultant, speaks to the group about her experiences in Afghanistan.

given the general prevalence of suspect practices in the construction sector and the pressure donors face to deliver quickly on high visibility infrastructure projects.⁴ The post-conflict specialists in attendance were particularly critical of a quick-win mentality that has not only failed to yield short-term victories but has often proved to be counter-productive by precluding early attention to institution building and by creating exaggerated expectations that are impossible to fulfill. The inflated wages and prices for goods that international actors pay were blamed for undermining the development of state capacity and adding to excessive expectations in the local population – both of which contribute to corruption. Those left out of the aid bonanza may feel justified engaging in corruption to secure similar levels of compensation.

- ***War economies, peace settlements, and illicit power structures:*** In recent decades, conflicts have been increasingly self-financed through

combatant exploitation of black markets and natural resources, creating special challenges for peacebuilding. Combatants may have little incentive to seek peace since they are profiting from war. In cases where a peace settlement has been achieved, former

According to the World Bank, nearly half of all post-conflict countries return to war within five years of signing a peace agreement.

combatants are often well-positioned to maintain their privileged positions. Peace frequently does not bring an end to the illicit economy. Wealth from this economy, along with military might, continues to be important sources of power in the emerging political and economic systems. These illicit power structures infiltrate the state and



Pictured from left to right: Lieutenant General (Ret.) Robert Ord, III, Dean of the School of International Graduate Studies, NPS; Sam Farr, US House of Representatives (CA-17); Matthew Vaccaro, Program Director, CSRS; and an aide to Congressman Farr.

democratic institutions, corrupting politicians or seeking political office for their leaders and allies to nourish their informal networks of influence.

Although illicit power structures often play a central role in uninstitutionalized war-torn states, the international community has largely failed to address these actors in a strategic way.⁵ In some cases, promoting privatization without implementing appropriate regulations and safeguards has allowed these actors to entrench themselves in the new economic system. In other cases, the international community engages these actors during peace talks, buying off potential “peace spoilers” by permitting their continued participation in corrupt activities. This may be an explicit realpolitik strategy that accepts corruption as a cost of peace or it may be a by-product of the international community’s inability to devise a strategy to marginalize these actors. Either way, the peace process creates “governance spoilers” whose perversion of

democracy and undermining of the state can threaten the whole transition.

While participants highlighted the possible ways the above factors contribute to corruption in post-conflict settings, a great deal remains unknown about the exact manner through which corruption usually increases during the transition from war to peace. Civil wars themselves and the transitions away from them take many shapes and may result in different patterns of corruption. Analysts and policy makers should be careful to avoid viewing the problem of corruption in post-conflict settings in an undifferentiated way and treating the challenges of combating corruption generically across post-conflict cases. For example, it is likely that petty corruption and grand corruption need complementary but different responses. Similarly, corruption linked to illicit power structures may pose different challenges and require a different strategy to combat it than corruption stimulated by the presence of high levels of international aid.

Prioritizing Anti-Corruption Efforts

While international actors have typically postponed anti-corruption measures to later stages of reform, there is a growing belief in the community that early action may allow actors to prevent and even undercut corruption.

Analysts of post-conflict corruption have noted that the same factors that increase the danger of corruption in post-conflict settings may also create a unique but fleeting opportunity to prevent and even undercut corruption.⁶ Large amounts of aid may provide leverage for international actors interested in promoting integrity, while the fluidity of the immediate post-conflict setting might facilitate the sidelining of corrupt elites. Despite these conditions, international actors have not taken advantage of this potential window of opportunity, giving short shrift to anti-corruption concerns in their stabilization and reconstruction efforts.

Workshop participants discussed the reasons most commonly given for relegating integrity measures to a second phase of reform in post-conflict settings. They agreed that while the arguments may have merit under certain circumstances, there is also ample evidence that neglecting anti-corruption efforts during initial stabilization and reconstruction efforts can be destabilizing.

Consequently, workshop participants felt that integrity concerns should figure more

prominently in the strategic and operational calculations of international actors from the start of their interventions. Corruption control should be a key objective, albeit one that needs to be balanced against other priorities, with a cost-benefits risk analysis conducted on a case-by-case basis.

Workshop participants believed that integrity concerns should figure more prominently in the strategic and operational calculations of international actors.

Reformers should not attempt to implement a long wish list of anti-corruption best practices. Instead, an in-depth understanding

Reasons Actors Give for Delaying Implementation of Integrity Measures



Reason

1

Fighting corruption is a worthy long-term objective, but overwhelmed reformers need to devote their time and energy in the short run to more pressing needs, like the delivery of humanitarian aid, reconstruction of infrastructure, and provision of security. From this perspective, the diversion of some funds is the necessary price to pay for the quick and effective delivery of assistance. Any time or energy spent on anti-corruption efforts detracts from completion of the primary stabilization and reconstruction mission. In contrast, participants stressed the ways in which corruption thwarts the accomplishment of the more pressing short-run objectives pursued by reformers. Humanitarian aid does not reach its intended recipients, shoddily constructed infrastructure crumbles, and corrupt police forces contribute to increased levels of insecurity. Of equal importance, public perceptions of corruption undermine the legitimacy of international actors and the state.



Reason

2

Fighting corruption is simply too difficult an undertaking in the short run. According to this view, corruption is so widespread and ingrained that short-term victories are unlikely. Given this perspective, it makes little sense to spend time – or precious resources – on near-term anti-corruption activities. While participants acknowledged that fighting corruption is a daunting task that will undoubtedly require long-term efforts to build institutions and change norms, they stressed that quick wins are possible. (See *Assessing Anti-Corruption Efforts* on page 13 for more information.) In addition, if integrity reforms are put off to the future, they may become much more difficult to carry out as corrupt actors entrench themselves during the transition to democracy.



Reason

3

Integrity reforms may be destabilizing if they threaten the economic and political interests of key parties to the peace settlement. Although this is a legitimate concern, workshop participants cautioned that paying off “peace spoilers” by permitting the continuation of corrupt activities can result in the creation of “governance spoilers” which undermine the legitimacy of the new state and perhaps the entire peace process. In hindsight, this raises the question of whether international actors might have been able to seek peace and stability without engaging in deals, whether formal peace settlements or ad hoc alliances with warlords, that contributed to spiraling levels of corruption. This requires some counterfactual reasoning but also an exploration of cases, if any exist, where reformers have been successful in confronting entrenched interests and preventing corruption.



Reason

4

Integrity reforms are culturally inappropriate in countries where traditional, patron-client relationships prevail and Western, post-modern notions of the distinction between the public and the private are absent. According to this view, anti-corruption efforts are, at best, a waste of energy since corruption is widely accepted. At worst, they may tear apart the social fabric, undermining informal social networks that fulfill important needs in the absence of a functioning state. Although there is no universal agreement on where the line should be drawn in determining corrupt activities, even in the developed world, participants argued that a great deal of the corruption that does take place in post-conflict settings – especially grand corruption – is widely condemned by country inhabitants. To the extent petty corruption is accepted, this is usually not a product of traditional values but rather the need to survive and the inability to imagine and operationalize a different way of doing things. External actors can help local actors change such a system, thus greatly improving the quality of their daily life. Finally, to the extent that corrupt networks are part of the social fabric, their targeting should be carefully considered. This should not prevent reformers from embarking on transformative anti-corruption campaigns, but these campaigns should be undertaken with a full understanding of the challenges they will face as well as the possible consequences of successful efforts.



Participants discuss best practices for mitigating corruption in post-conflict environments.

of country context, or situational awareness, should inform a strategic analysis of the relationship between corruption and conflict and ensuring an equally strategic design of integrity reforms.

Toward this end, actors need to devote more energy to understanding the kinds and levels of corruption that threaten the transition to peace and stability in a given country. Under what conditions does corruption reach a tipping point? Are certain kinds of corruption more disruptive

than others? For example, corruption in the judicial system might be judged a priority, given the sector's impact on so many dimensions of transition, including the average citizen's confidence in the political system, business willingness to invest in the country, and the success of security sector reforms. At the same time, policy makers need to understand how, and which, anti-corruption efforts are likely to reinforce or undermine their goals of stabilization and reconstruction in the short run. A primer on this issue follows.

Assessing Anti-Corruption Efforts

By fighting corruption, international actors can score quick wins that contribute to the legitimacy of the new order. The most effective way to accomplish this is through preventive measures based on state monitoring, increased transparency, and community empowerment.

If the promotion of integrity is to be incorporated into the earliest phases of the peacebuilding, stabilization and reconstruction agenda, then it is essential to determine which anti-corruption measures yield short-term results, are politically feasible, and have a minimum of destabilizing side effects. Accordingly, workshop participants reviewed anti-corruption initiatives – ranging from international and regional standard setting to national-level anti-corruption commissions to community-based monitoring – in an effort to identify lessons for effective institution building. They found that while a number of the most commonly recommended approaches are incomplete, ineffective, or even counter-productive, it is possible to score quick wins over corruption that contribute directly to the legitimacy of the state in post-conflict settings. Contrary to conventional wisdom, these early victories tend to come not from high-profile prosecutions of emblematic individuals but rather from preventive efforts based on state monitoring, increased transparency, and community empowerment. Punitive law enforcement approaches were often less effective, as lack of political will and weak judiciaries undermined their deterrent effect.

A. Why Implementing Standards and Legal Frameworks Is Necessary but Insufficient

Actors have made great strides in the past decade to establish codes of conducts and legal norms censoring corruption, within both the private and public sectors. Examples include the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Anti-Bribery Convention, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, and the United Nations Convention Against Corruption. OECD's Stability Pact Anti-Corruption Initiative (SPAI) has worked hard for the passage of national frameworks reflecting these international norms in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, including the post-conflict cases of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia. The prospect of European Union membership has been an important carrot to guarantee passage, if not always enforcement, of appropriate legislation.⁷ In post-conflict settings like Afghanistan where former combatants or warlords populate the legislature and executive ministries, it is difficult to accomplish this goal. Elsewhere, the challenge is ensuring that the norms are actually enforced and do not remain paper tigers.

B. Enforcement Approach: Fewer Quick Wins than Expected

Many workshop participants questioned the primary emphasis international donors place on a law enforcement approach to corruption in post-conflict settings where investigative and judicial capacity is typically quite low. In theory, the successful prosecution of a few emblematic individuals for corruption should send the signal that graft is a high-risk activity that will not be tolerated. In practice, however, few individuals are indicted and even fewer convicted. Failed investigations signal that corrupt individuals are above the law, increasing cynicism within the general public. The enforcement approach is also highly vulnerable to politicization at both the local and national levels, as political figures level corruption charges at their rivals. While a law enforcement approach is a necessary part of any comprehensive anti-corruption efforts, in most cases it has not delivered the early victories that many had hoped. To be effective, it must be accompanied by a greater emphasis on judicial reform early on.

C. Anti-Corruption Commissions Are Often Ineffective

Experts overwhelmingly agree that anti-corruption commissions have for the most part proven ineffective in fighting corruption in developing countries.⁸ These institutions lack a minimum of organizational capacity, have limited political backing, and are vulnerable to becoming corrupt themselves. They are asked to carry out investigations of high-level corruption that are complex and difficult undertakings even in developed countries and to bear the administrative burden of creating registries of assets that have little practical use.⁹ Says one expert: “Primary systems [such as chief financial officers within line ministries] should be in place before secondary bodies, like anti-corruption commissions, look to see whether these systems are working.”¹⁰ Workshop participants echoed this sentiment, stressing the need for the

mainstreaming of anti-corruption measures within government ministries.

D. Why Building Government Capacity Is Critical

International aid agencies have struggled to find ways to prevent the diversion of aid money in countries where government capacity and administrative accountability is low. They recognize that approaches which bypass existing state ministries do little to contribute to the building of corruption-resistant indigenous institutions. The governance efforts of many international institutions seek to increase the competence of line and sectoral ministries, while rule of law initiatives attempt to do the same for the judiciary and police. Workshop participants stressed the need for more support to these ongoing efforts, but emphasized that they should include explicit anti-corruption dimensions. For example, judicial reform requires specific attention to ethics training for judges, while educational and health sector reforms might include transparency measures and the empowering of user groups to monitor service delivery. As the next section illustrates, efforts to build corruption-resistant governmental institutions are often complemented by the empowerment of civil society organizations.

E. Quick Wins with Transparency, State Monitoring, and Community Empowerment

The promotion of transparency has long been a mainstay of anti-corruption proposals. The World Bank frequently cites experimental studies that show the importance of transparency in encouraging honest behavior in a wide range of cultures. For example, the number of individuals saying they would return an envelope of money found on the floor of a parking garage increases dramatically, from one-third of respondents to three-quarters, when there is just a 30% possibility that a video



Sarah Farnsworth of the Initiative for Inclusive Security presents her group's understanding of the characteristics of effective anti-corruption measures.

camera is in the garage.¹¹ At the workshop, a former official in Afghanistan's Ministry of Finance provided a related anecdote, noting that a closed process of bidding for road construction led to a winning bid of 2.9 million per kilometer. When the bidding was repeated under more transparent procedures, the cost of construction fell to 1.1 million per kilometer.

Under the right circumstances, making information available about the procedures and substance of government can empower community groups to hold local officials and elites accountable and reduce corruption. For example, posting information at local schools indicating the amount of money provided by the national government can lead to an increase in the actual allocation of funds by local leaders. Providing cross-border traders with data on the legitimate fees border guards are entitled to charge can give locals leverage in their dealing with corrupt government officials. In an US Agency for International Development-funded project in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), information was key to mobilizing users against low-level corruption on the waterways

and to enabling their resistance. Innovative Resources Management (IRM), a US non-profit organization, analyzed tracasseries on the waterways and found that 94% of the locally-collected administrative fees either were not authorized by law or were pocketed by the agents.¹² This objective information about the economic costs of corruption helped create outrage and catalyze action against a practice which heretofore had largely been accepted as a way of life. Users were organized into committees against corruption and armed with print-outs of permitted fees and access to public high-frequency radios that promoted transparency and facilitated networking with one another and with allied officials in the Ministry of Interior who were monitoring the situation and sanctioning corrupt local agents.

The success of the project in the DRC suggests that an information-based approach that empowers grassroots, functional organizations is feasible in even the most corrupt and conflict-ridden society. Key to the success of that project was an understanding of the incentives that motivated individuals to mobilize against

corruption. Another crucial ingredient for success was identifying stakeholders in the national government – high officials in the Ministry of Interior who had a vested interest in the situation and could use their power and authority to leverage change.

F. Incentive Structures and Leverage Points for Reform

Lack of political will is frequently cited as the most significant obstacle to integrity reform. Despite this, in most countries it is possible to identify key stakeholder groups with incentives to fight corruption. Workshop participants argued that successful anti-corruption efforts require an analysis of the incentive structures of actors to identify possible leverage points for reform.

In many of the examples cited at the workshop, the local community groups that participated in anti-corruption efforts were often user groups with a direct stake in reducing corruption. In some cases, the groups were well aware of how corruption undermined their interests and were prepared to act after being equipped with information (for example, appropriate fees). In other cases, such as the Congo waterways example, some consciousness-raising was necessary: IRM sought to quantify the costs of corruption to shake the people out of complacency. By linking the fight against corruption to practical, economic welfare concerns such as the provision of food and regional economic growth, IRM was able to gain support from a wide range of actors in civil society and government for the anti-corruption efforts. In this way, grassroots groups were linked to officials in the Ministry of Interior who had a shared interest in reducing corruption as part of their interest in increasing tax revenues and economic growth. As this example demonstrates, even in the most corrupt systems, there are individual ministers and ministries with an institutional interest in pursuing integrity reform. The challenge is to identify and engage these “islands of integrity.”

It is important to note that user groups do not have an automatic interest in monitoring all types of corruption; incentives must be analyzed rather than assumed. For example, a study of road construction in Indonesia showed that community groups effectively monitored funds meant for wages, but did not prevent corruption in the materials procurement process, even though the groups had more information on the latter than the former.¹³ Presumably, the quality of roads resulting from the project was a public good that presented collective action problems for the monitoring groups.

Frequently, media campaigns denouncing the evils of corruption are used to create the incentives or political will to carry out integrity reforms. By creating public awareness of the problem, the campaigns hope to motivate citizen participation in oversight groups and create pressure on politicians to address the issue. These campaigns seem to work best where specific practices are targeted and/or where the newly created incentives to fight corruption can be channeled effectively. For example, in Nicaragua, a media campaign to reduce pensions and perks of retired presidents and top officials led to the introduction of new legislation. In the case of the DRC above, quantitative information on the harmfulness of tracasseries created outrage among the population, but the key to success was channeling public response into organizations which were equipped with the right resources to combat the problem. In the Indonesian road project study, community groups had the most leverage in combating corruption in districts where local officials face more competitive elections.¹⁴

In contrast, media campaigns that denounce corruption in more general terms can raise public awareness of the problem but also increase frustration if no remedy is forthcoming. In these cases, the increased awareness of corruption often serves merely to increase public distrust of government. The resulting “throw the bums out” sentiment can be exploited repeatedly by challengers to oust



Pictured from left to right: Brent Dark of the Asian Development Bank, Karen Hussmann, and John Derick of the Center of Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance of US Pacific Command.

incumbents, thus contributing to the political instability that is a breeding ground for corruption. To make matters worse, politicians elected on anti-corruption platforms often show little commitment to their campaign promises upon assuming office or use anti-corruption prosecutions only to pursue their political opponents.

G. The Broader Implications of Quick Wins in Building Public Trust and a Constituency for Reform

The desire for quick wins in post-conflict settings often takes the form of an urge to spend or, in the case of anti-corruption, to prosecute. Workshop participants were critical of these approaches which often failed to accomplish their goals. As one US civil-affairs officer who worked in Iraq put it: “We spent money to win friends and influence people. But as soon as the money was gone, so were our friends.” In many cases, the pursuit of quick wins had the opposite of its intended effect, undermining public trust in government by creating expectations about improvements in daily life that were subsequently dashed by

shoddily executed reconstruction projects, the incompetence of corrupt police forces, and other exemplars of government corruption.

In contrast, the quick wins based on institution building – both within government and in the community – improve the quality of life for ordinary citizens by reducing the petty corruption they face on a daily basis, even if a great deal of corruption still persists elsewhere in the system. Given the dire situation facing most ordinary citizens, workshop participants felt that anti-corruption efforts in sectors like health, education, and policing which improve the basic quality of life were most important in the short run. In addition, since the local groups involved in many of the monitoring efforts were not anti-corruption groups per se but functional organizations or local governance structures, their strengthening should have a positive spillover effect on other development and democracy goals.

Quick wins also build public trust in the government by demonstrating the authorities’ willingness to deal with corruption. In some cases, credible efforts to increase ethical behavior in government increased public trust even when it was unclear whether the reforms reduced corruption. Dr. Laina Reynolds Levy reported on a project in Kosovo where her non-governmental organization, Partners for Democratic Change, worked with municipal inspectors for three months to develop a widely accepted Code of Ethics for Inspectors.¹⁵ After the adoption of the code, inspectors reported greater professional pride and citizens reported increased trust in municipal government. This suggests that local and grassroots measures addressing corruption should be publicized, especially since they are much less likely to receive media attention than high-profile prosecutions.

There was also a sense among workshop participants that quick wins at the local level may help build a constituency for additional integrity reforms at the national level,

particularly in the area of grand corruption which has posed such a challenge for both developing and developed countries. Additional research is needed on the links between administrative and grand corruption and policymakers should seek innovative ways to develop links between anti-corruption efforts at both levels.

H. Donor Practices

While international aid agencies have worked on preventing corruption in their own aid programs, this often focuses more on accountability to home governments rather than to local populations. The experience of international donors after the Asian tsunami, however, suggests that the lessons on transparency, accountability, and community empowerment which are the key to quick wins domestically can also be applied to donor practices. In that case, physical reconstruction and institution building were pursued simultaneously by donors who realized their success would be measured by the ability to deliver aid not only quickly but effectively.¹⁶

International donors involved local leaders, women's groups, and other NGOs in both the design and implementation of aid programs. Country-owned websites provided information on procurement contracts and bidders, as well as aid recipients, and mechanisms were created whereby local groups could provide feedback. These well-publicized monitoring efforts and random audits helped to increase the accountability of international and national actors. Importantly, these oversight institutions were incorporated in donor programs – and budgets – from the start.

Despite the priority some international agencies assign to anti-corruption goals, the general neglect of this issue in post-conflict settings indicates that problems of political will are not limited to domestic actors. Awareness campaigns are necessary within the international

community, as is gaining an understanding of the incentives and leverage different actors have to undertake integrity reforms.

I. The Military

The lessons identified for donors apply equally to the military, which has become increasingly involved in supporting governance in a range of post-conflict settings. This is particularly the case in countries like Afghanistan and Iraq, where civil affairs teams work with civilian agencies and community groups in an effort to deliver aid and reconstruct local governance. In addition, strategic decisions to engage corrupt actors in the pursuit of security goals need to be balanced against the increasing evidence of harm caused by such alliances.

J. Confronting Illicit Power Structures Remains a Formidable Challenge

Efforts to advance development and governance in general, and anti-corruption efforts specifically, have placed a great deal of emphasis on increasing government capacity or empowering civil society. Much less attention has been paid to a third group of actors – illicit power structures – that often undermines peace, development, and democracy.¹⁷ This is beginning to change as analysts and policymakers acknowledge the fundamental challenges posed by these actors.¹⁸ The US State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement has recently spearheaded a fight against kleptocracy, intended to deny corrupt actors safe havens and access to international banking institutions.¹⁹ This law enforcement approach should be complemented by a comprehensive strategy that addresses issues such as the transformation of war economies and the political economy of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration.

Recommendations

Workshop participants developed a number of recommendations to help improve anti-corruption initiatives. Chief among them: development of a methodology for assessing the relationship between corruption and conflict, increased attention to the incentives for behavior and the leverage wielded by key actors, and establishment of a clearinghouse for information and best practices.

Based on the workshop findings, participants made a number of recommendations for future policy research, operational innovation, and practitioner education.

Study the intervention of the international community in post-conflict countries

to determine how it affects corruption and how corruption affects its various goals. Are integrity and accountability standards set and pursued effectively? To what extent does the distortion of local markets and heightened expectations affect integrity in the society? To what extent were the primary goals of security, peace, and delivery of humanitarian and reconstruction aid negatively affected by corruption, or conversely, aided by anti-corruption efforts?

- In what ways, and how frequently, do peace settlements and other strategic decisions to secure peace affect corruption levels and consequently, the overall goals of stabilization and reconstruction?
- What is the relationship between illicit power structures and the embedded

networks of corruption that imperil governance and democratic stability? How often does the buying off of “peace spoilers” lead to entrenched illicit power structures? In contrast, to what extent does the failure to buy off former combatants – i.e., poorly implemented or under-resourced demobilization and reintegration efforts – contribute to the continuation of illicit power structures populated by out-of-work soldiers? What lessons can be learned from post-conflict cases which have escaped the scourge of corruption linked to illicit power structures? Do existing anti-corruption reforms effectively target these power structures?

- What kinds of corruption are most threatening to peace and stability?

Establish a clearinghouse of information on anti-corruption work in post-conflict countries.

Very little specific work has been done on this issue, at least in terms of documented experience, research and lessons learned.²⁰ The most useful information would

go beyond a technocratic laundry list of integrity reforms and provide some strategic analysis and context for action.

In addition to identifying which kinds of integrity reforms are effective and feasible, participants also expressed an interest in seeing analyses of the following issues:

- How can the much-needed law enforcement approach to combating corruption be reconceived to enhance its effectiveness and reduce the negative side effects of politicization and public cynicism?
- What is the relationship between anti-corruption efforts at the micro level and efforts at the intermediate and macro levels? Can micro level successes provide the impetus for reform at the national level? Can success at the lower-level help unravel larger networks of illicit influence, or are these successes only possible to the extent they do not harm other interests? Answers to these questions will depend on more research and creative initiatives from the donor side to foster linkage between the levels and create spaces for dialogue.

Develop a methodology for assessing the relationship between corruption and conflict in individual countries and designing an appropriate response.

Participants stressed the need for situational awareness of country circumstances that would help determine both the priority anti-corruption efforts should be accorded as well as which integrity measures would be most effective and feasible.

These comprehensive country assessments from the anti-corruption angle should include an analysis of the political economy of corruption (e.g., stakeholders and distribution of formal, informal and military powers with particular emphasis on illicit power structures), geopolitical

context and interests of foreign countries, cultural norms, beliefs, and perceptions about corruption, as well as an analysis of governmental capacity to fight corruption.

Devising such a methodology raises a number of issues and possibilities:

- How should this corruption-focused assessment be integrated with existing conflict assessments?
- Do traditional methodologies for measuring corruption need to be modified for post-conflict settings? How might public opinion surveys be modified to account for key aspects of post-conflict corruption? Do new measures need to be devised to capture the central role that illicit power structures may play in fuelling corruption, particularly grand corruption, in post-conflict settings?
- Prevailing approaches for analyzing government capacity, which focus on the transparency of institutions, should be complemented by an analysis of the incentive structures actors face in adopting and implementing integrity reforms and leverage points.
- An in-depth understanding of the shadowy issue of corruption requires finding a way to tap into the extensive, but underutilized knowledge of country conditions resident in development agencies and in-country sources. Developing this capability would benefit all actions by international actors and not just their anti-corruption efforts.
- This diagnostic enterprise might provide a starting point for strategic coordination among the diverse actors in the international community. The analysis could be carried out jointly by international and domestic actors or by one agency on behalf of others. While coordinated action may not result, such an approach could help create a shared



Pictured from left to right: Dr. Laina Reynolds Levy; Ahmad Jawaid, formerly with the Afghan Ministry of Finance; Jonathan Roby of the Joint Interagency Coordination Group, US Central Command; Captain Chet Storrs, US Navy Reserve; Brent Dark; John Derick; and Dr. Ann Igoe, an independent consultant.

understanding of the problem or at least shared language for characterizing the situation. The experience of the Asian Development Bank and other international actors in tsunami relief efforts might provide a model for this approach.

Analyze the incentives — or lack thereof — that different international actors have to address corruption and the potential leverage each wields. The diverse set of actors involved in stability and reconstruction operations typically have different purposes, motivations, organizational structures, and methods of operation which present challenges of coordination and combined action in all spheres, and anti-corruption is no exception. An understanding of organizational goals and incentive structures will be necessary to carry out the following imperatives:

- *Incorporate anti-corruption issues into the strategic planning process for stabilization and reconstruction*

operations. This needs to be done in a way that prevents organizational funding streams, spending pressures, missions, rivalries, and biases from undermining anti-corruption initiatives.

- *Mainstream an anti-corruption perspective into all initiatives.* Build the will and capacity of sectoral specialists, like health and education providers, to incorporate anti-corruption measures into their programs. Anti-corruption measures should also be a key part of security sector reform.
- *Integrate anti-corruption concerns into post-conflict military planning.* This would include considering how strategies to pursue security both affect levels of corruption and might be affected by corruption; planning for military support to law enforcement where appropriate, particularly in settings where illicit power structures threaten governability; and incorporating strategies for building corruption-resistant institutions into the training received by civil-affairs teams.

Endnotes

- 1 Michael Miklaucic, US Agency for International Development (USAID), "Illicit Power Structures: A Provisional Typology," presentation to the workshop on *Post-Conflict Institution Building: Beating Corruption*, Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies, Naval Postgraduate School, December 13, 2006.
- 2 In particular, see *Corruption in Post-War Reconstruction* (UNDP, Tiri, and Lebanon Association for Transparency, January 2005); Transparency International's *Global Corruption Report 2005* with a special focus on corruption in construction and post-conflict reconstruction; Philippe LeBillon, "Buying Peace or Fuelling War? The Role of Corruption in Armed Conflicts," *Journal of International Development* 15 (2003): 413-26; and Madalene O'Donnell, "Post-Conflict Corruption: A Rule of Law Agenda?" in *Civil War and the Rule of Law*, International Peace Academy, 2006. For a review of the literature on conflict and corruption, see Alix J., William J. Durch, Margaret Midyette, Sarah Rose, and Jason Terry. *Mapping and Fighting Corruption in War-Torn States: Report from the Project on Rule of Law in Post-Conflict Settings*. Washington, DC, The Henry L. Stimson Center, December 2006. Case studies by Tiri's Network for Integrity in Reconstruction were released after the CSRS workshop and are available online at www.tiri.org.
- 3 Paul Collier, *The Conflict Trap*, Washington, DC, The World Bank, 2002.
- 4 Transparency International, *Global Corruption Report 2005*.
- 5 For a notable exception, see Michael Miklaucic, USAID, "Illicit Power Structures: A Provisional Typology," presentation at the CSRS workshop on *Post-Conflict Institution Building: Beating Corruption*.
- 6 O'Donnell, "Post-Conflict Corruption: A Rule of Law Agenda?" and *Corruption in Post-War Reconstruction*.
- 7 Cornel-Virgiliu Calinescu, European Union Stability Pact Anti-Corruption Initiative, presentation at the CSRS workshop on *Post-Conflict Institution Building: Beating Corruption*.
- 8 O'Donnell, "Post-Conflict Corruption: A Rule of Law Agenda?" and Robert Williams and Alan Doig. "Achieving Success and Avoiding Failure in Anti-Corruption Commissions: Developing the Role of Donors," U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, U4 Brief No. 1, January 2007.
- 9 Williams and Doig, "Achieving Success and Avoiding Failure in Anti-Corruption Commissions."
- 10 O'Donnell, "Post-Conflict Corruption: A Rule of Law Agenda?"
- 11 At the same time, the percentage saying they would keep the money drops from 22 to four. Colum Garrity, "Strengthening World Bank Group Engagement on Governance and Anti-Corruption," presentation to the CSRS workshop on *Post-Conflict Institution Building: Beating Corruption*.
- 12 Michael Brown, "A Model for Combating Corruption Hands On: Lessons from the Congo and Potential for Replicability in Africa and Beyond," presentation at the CSRS workshop on *Post-Conflict Institution Building: Beating Corruption*.
- 13 Benjamin A. Olken, "Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia," National Bureau of Economic Research, October 2005. The threat of an audit from national authorities was effective in reducing corruption in materials, reinforcing the importance of building anti-corruption components (such as audits) into development programs.
- 14 Olken, 2005.
- 15 Dr. Laina Reynolds Levy, Partners for Democratic Change, presentation at the CSRS workshop on *Post-Conflict Institution Building: Beating Corruption*.
- 16 Brent Dark, Asian Development Bank, presentation at the CSRS workshop on *Post-Conflict Institution Building: Beating Corruption*.
- 17 Michael Miklaucic, USAID, "Illicit Power Structures: A Provisional Typology," presentation at the CSRS workshop on *Post-Conflict Institution Building: Beating Corruption*.
- 18 Mickalucic and Mike Dzeidzic of the United States Institute for Peace are heading a broader project on illicit power structures and the implications for peace, development and democracy.
- 19 David Luna, "Impact of Kleptocracy & Transnational Criminal Threats in Post-Conflict Environments: A Critical Need for Prosecuting Corruption and Dismantling Transnational Illicit Networks," presentation at the CSRS workshop on *Post-Conflict Institution Building: Beating Corruption*.
- 20 Notable exceptions include recently realized projects on post-conflict corruption spearheaded by the non-profit organization, Tiri, and a pair of UNDP-commissioned country studies of Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of Congo. See *Corruption in Post-War Reconstruction*, Tiri, Network for Integrity in Reconstruction research projects, January 2007. Available at www.tiri.org; Karen Hussmann and Marie-Ange Bunga, "Case Study on Democratic Republic of the Congo. Anticorruption Projects Limited by Logics of Transition," paper commissioned by the UNDP, October 2005; and Karen Hussmann and A.H. Monjurul Kabir, "Fighting Corruption – The Case of Afghanistan," draft, December 2006

Author Biography

Jeanne Giraldo
 Visiting Lecturer
 National Security
 Affairs Department
 Naval Postgraduate
 School



Jeanne Giraldo teaches in the National Security Affairs Department at the Naval Postgraduate School, where she is currently heading a multiyear project

on fighting corruption in post-conflict settings for the Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies. She was a founder and director of the Program for Drug Control Strategy and Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School and is a participant in the Latin American regional program of the Center for Civil-Military Relations. She has traveled widely in Latin America and written on organized crime, civil-military relations, and democratization and political representation. Her most recent publication is *Terrorism Financing and State Responses: A Comparative Perspective* (Stanford University Press, 2007), co-edited with Harold Trinkunas.

Other publications include: “Transnational Crime” (with Harold Trinkunas) in Alan Collins, ed. *Contemporary Security Studies*; two chapters – “Legislatures and National Defense: Global Comparisons” and “Defense Budgets, Democratic Civilian Control, and Effective Governance” – in Thomas Bruneau and Scott Tollefson, *Who Guards the Guardians and How: Democratic Civil-Military Relations*; “Parties, Institutions, and Market Reforms in Constructing Democracies” (with Jorge Domínguez) in Jorge I. Domínguez and Abraham F. Lowenthal, eds., *Constructing Democratic Governance: Latin America and the Caribbean in the 1990s – Themes and Issues*; and “Development and Democracy in Chile: Finance Minister Alejandro Foxley and the Concertación’s Project for the 1990s” in Jorge I. Domínguez, ed., *Technopols: Freeing Politics and Markets in Latin America in the 1990s*. Giraldo received her undergraduate degree in politics and Latin American studies at Princeton University and her master’s degree and doctoral training at Harvard University.

Event Participants

Participants

Alix Boucher

Henry L. Stimson Center

Michael Brown

Innovative Resources
Management

Cornel-Virgiliu Calinescu

European Union Stability Pact
Anti-Corruption Initiative

Brent Dark

Asian Development Bank

John Derick

Center of Excellence in
Disaster Management
and Humanitarian Assistance
US Pacific Command

Hugh Edleston

Transparency International (UK)

**Major Junior de
Fabribeckers**

Ministry of Development
and Cooperation
Government of Belgium

Sarah Farnsworth

The Initiative for
Inclusive Security

Colum Garrity

World Bank

Nadia Hashimi

Global Majority

Karen Hussmann

Independent Consultant to the
United Nations Development
Programme

Colonel Alan Irish

352nd Civil Affairs Brigade
US Army

Ahmad Jawaid

Former Official with the Afghan
Ministry of Finance

Randall Kaailau

Office of the Coordinator for
Reconstruction and Stabilization
US Department of State

Chris King

Former Senior Consultant to
the Commission on Public
Integrity in Iraq

Diana Klein

International Alert

Dr. Laina Reynolds Levy

Partners for Democratic Change

David Luna

Bureau of International Narcotics
and Law Enforcement
US Department of State

Michael Miklaucic

Office of Democracy and
Governance
US Agency for
International Development

Captain Jonathan Roby

Joint Interagency
Coordination Group
US Central Command

Mark Sedra

Bonn International Center
for Conversion

Captain Chet Storrs

426th Civil Affairs Battalion
US Marine Corps

Lieutenant Colonel Glenn Tolle

US Naval Postgraduate School

Ross Wherry

Research Triangle Institute

Facilitators and Staff

John Christiansen

Center for Stabilization and
Reconstruction Studies

Jeanne Giraldo

National Security
Affairs Department
Naval Postgraduate School

Dr. Ann Igoe

Independent Consultant

Gwen Sanders

Graduate Student
US Naval Postgraduate School

Dr. Anna Simons

Department of Defense Analysis
Naval Postgraduate School

Nick Tomb

Center for Stabilization and
Reconstruction Studies

Miriam Turlington

Center for Stabilization and
Reconstruction Studies

Matthew Vaccaro

Center for Stabilization and
Reconstruction Studies

POST-CONFLICT INSTITUTION BUILDING: BEATING CORRUPTION

DECEMBER 10—13, 2006



CENTER FOR STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION STUDIES
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL • MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

